Window on Eurasia

Culture, Not Cash Driving Demographic Trends in Russia

 

Paul Goble

Vienna, August 21, 2006 – Differences in continuing attachment to traditional culture explain far more of the variance in demographic
behaviour among national groups in the Russian Federation than do
variations in material well-being, according to a factor analysis of
post-Soviet census data.

Consequently, policies predicated on the notion that money alone will
be successful in changing such behaviour are doomed to failure and may
even prove counterproductive, unless officials recognize this fact and
combine them with other measures as well.

In an article for the Russian Civilization Foundation, sociologist
Vardan Bagdasaryan describes what he calls “the ethno-confessional
limits of the demographic crisis in Russia” and discusses the
difficulties involved in changing the current situation
[http://www.rustrana.ru/article.php?nid+26671&sq=19.23.673,1415&crypt].

Comparing the findings of the 1989 and 2002 censuses, Bagdasaryan notes
that the total population in the latter year was 98.7 percent of that
in the former, while the number of ethnic Russians fell to only 96.7
percent in the latter year – a decline of two percent more.

Looking at the issue more broadly, he reports, not only the Russians
but all other peoples of Russia -- except for the Osetians -- “who belong
to the Orthodox cultural world” declined during this period, while
all the Muslim and Buddhist peoples of Russia “without exception” saw
their numbers increase.

Bagdasaryan notes that only 18 subjects of the Russian Federation
currently have a positive balance of births over deaths, and 17 of
these are non-Russian national territorial formations. The only exception to
this pattern is the predominantly ethnic Russian region of Tyumen.

Indeed, he continues, the demographic crisis of excess deaths over
births that has been characteristic of the Russian and more generally
Orthodox part of the population has “simply passed them by.”

Many analysts attempt to explain this development by pointing to the
location of these groups – more Muslims live in the southern portions
of the country – or to their level of urbanization – Russians are
more urbanized than most other national groups in that country.

But such explanations are not supported by the facts, Bagdasaryan says.
On the one hand, birthrates among ethnic Russian women living in
national republics turn out in every case to be lower than the
representatives of Muslim or Buddhist groups among whom they live.

And on the other, pagan groups in the Far East, Siberia and the North grew rapidly during this intercensal period – with the Manis
increasing by 44.6 percent and the Khants by 30 percent, for example
– despite the extreme climatic conditions in the regions where they live.

This pattern suggests, Bagdasaryan says, that those peoples who
traditionally followed Orthodoxy were far more affected by Soviet
atheistic propaganda, something that left them without the kind of
cultural defense that other religious traditions – including Islam,
Buddhism and paganism – provided their followers.

That finding in turn inevitably leads to the conclusion, Bagdasaryan
continues, that there is little possibility of overcoming the current
situation via material stimuli alone.

In support of that argument, the sociologist reports on a study of the
influence of various factors on demographic behaviour such as
birthrates. With one being a maximum, the greatest influence on
demographic behaviour, with a coefficient of 0.83, was the ideological
and spiritual condition of the various peoples.

Other factors had a smaller influence, he reports: the national
orientation of the Russian state – 0.75, state administrative
policies – 0.59, and material conditions of life – 0.49, or only a little
more than half the impact on demographic behaviour that cultural
factors do.

Given that pattern, he continues, the use of monetary mechanisms to
change the birthrate will likely produce exactly the reverse of what
their backers hopes: Such investments will have little impact on those
groups like the Russians and other Orthodox communities but will
stimulate even higher birthrates among Muslims.

They will have one positive consequence, however, Bagdasaryan
acknowledges: they will improve the quality of life of those already
here and thus may contribute to the reversal of falling life
expectancies among Russians – but that is not how the case for such
investments is typically made.

In support of his belief that attachment to traditional culture helps
to promote better demographic outcomes, Bagdasaryan puts forward two sets
of data: one concerning demographic data in Russia over the last 150
years and the other about demographic behaviour in European countries.

At the end of the 19th century, he notes, when the Russian Empire was
an Orthodox state committed to Orthodox values, birthrates among ethnic
Russians were almost 1.5 times higher than those among Muslims living
within the boundaries of that country.

Soviet policies changed that: “the detraditionalization of the
Russian people touched the very mental sides of its existence. The desire to
have a successor generation was at the end of the Soviet epoch lower
among Russian women than among those of any titular nationality of the
union republics.”

And that trend was exacerbated by the anti-national policies of the
Russian government in the first decade after the collapse of the Soviet
Union, policies that led Russians and others in the Orthodox areal to
look to the future with less confidence and to be less willing as a
result to bring children into it.

Bagdasaryan’s other set of evidence concerns demographic behaviour in
Europe. He reports that 2002 data from 33 European countries supports
his contention that traditional culture is the most important factor in
explaining birthrates and other forms of demographic behaviour.

At first glance, he acknowledges, the differences among these countries
in terms of birth rates may seem relatively small. But if one divides
the European countries into two categories – the eight which have
monarchies and the 25 which are republics – one can easily see the
continuing impact of traditional values.

Of the eight monarchies, Bagdasaryan reports, all have birthrates above
ten per 1,000 annually, whereas among the 25 republics, only seven of
them exceed that figure.

“Of course,” he acknowledgves, “in contemporary constitutional
monarchies, the crowned heads have only nominal and largely decorative
power. However, the very fact of the preservation of traditional political institutions provides evidence of the presence of a certain
traditional potential.”

Bagdasaryan does not argue that Russia should escape its current
demographic problems by restoring the monarchy, but he does suggest
that the government should focus on culture rather than cash as a way out
and thus advance under the slogan: “live as long as in the West and give
birth as much as in the East.”

* * * *

Two other reports earlier this month provide some additional context
for Bagdasaryan’s article. “Vechernyaya Moskva” noted that Russia’s
demographic situation is becoming so dire that the question may soon be
not “how to live?” but rather “who will be around to live?”
[http://www.vmdaily.ru/main/viewarticle.php?id=25954].

It reported on fertility rates in various countries. In Tajikistan, the
paper said, there were 3.68 children per woman. In the US, this figure
was 2.06. In China it was 1.68. But in Russia as a whole, the average
woman had 1.34 children, and the average Muscovite woman had 1.14.
Simple replacement of population requires about 2.2.

And the paper pointed to a still more worrisome fact: Russia’s very
low fertility rates are likely to have an even more negative impact in
the future, even if they rise slightly. That is become the number of
young women who could become mothers is much smaller than their
predecessors.

The paper’s only upbeat note was that the number of abortions in the
Russian Federation: In 1990, there were 206 abortions for each 100 live
births. Now, there are 122 abortions for every 100 new babies.

And Babr.ru, a news site geared to Siberia and the Russian Far East
released results of its informal poll of visitors to that site on how
they identify themselves. That poll suggests that ethnic Russian
identity as such may be weakening at least in some regions of the
country
[http://babr.ru/index.php?pt=vote&event=rez&IDE=205].

Of the 2048 people who have responded to this open poll since January
31, 40.3 percent call themselves Sibiryaks, 35.6 percent say they are
Russians, 12.2 percent say they are Rossiyane, 5.6 percent call
themselves “cosmopolitans,” 4.4 percent say they are
“inogorodtsy” (“aliens”), and 1.9 percent say they are
“Moskaly” – a slang term for Muscovite.

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